Sunday, January 8, 1989, was a day many people will never forget.

Christmas and New Year had come and gone, and it had been just over two weeks since Pan Am Flight 103 had exploded over the small Scottish town of Lockerbie, killing all 259 people on board and a further 11 on the ground.

There was an uneasy feeling at London’s Heathrow Airport (LHR) as 118 passengers, including one infant, boarded British Midland Flight 092, operated by a brand new Boeing 737-400 (G-OBME), for the short domestic service to Belfast International Airport (BFS).

Little did they know that in a few hours, they would be involved in a disaster that would change the aviation industry forever.

On board the flight that evening were eight crew members, including Captain Kevin Hunt (43), a veteran pilot who had been with the airline since 1966, and First Officer David McClelland (39). In the cabin were six crew members: Ali Osman, Flight Service Manager (FSM), Debbie Griffiths (Flight Supervisor), Jamie Carter, Barbara Jones, Sharon Freestone and Jonathan Collins.

The Flight

At 19:52 local time, the aircraft took off from Heathrow, and the cabin crew commenced the in-flight service. A short time later, while climbing through 28,300 feet, there was a loud bang, and severe vibrations could be felt along with a strong smell of burning.

In the cabin, smoke could be seen pouring in through the ventilation system, and passengers seated on the left could see flames and sparks coming from the No. 1 (left) engine. The cabin crew later described the noise as a low, repetitive thudding, “like a car backfiring,” and one described how the vibrations shook the walls of the forward galley. Passengers were immediately instructed to return to their seats and fasten their seat belts.

Captain Hunt and First Officer McClelland began addressing the emergency, quickly realising they had a problem with one of the aircraft’s two CFM International CFM56 engines.

Hunt asked McClelland which one was malfunctioning, to which the First Officer replied, “It’s the le-…no, the right one.” Hunt then shut down the No. 2 (right) engine and arranged a diversion to East Midlands Airport (EMA).

Once they believed the problem had been dealt with, the commander called the Flight Service Manager (FSM), Ali Osman, to the flight deck. He instructed them to clear up the cabin and pack everything away, as they would be diverting. About a minute later, the FSM returned and said, “Sorry to trouble you….The passengers are very, very panicky.” The captain then made a PA to say they had trouble with the right engine and would be diverting to East Midlands.

Immediately, many on board became alarmed when the pilot mentioned problems with the ‘right’ engine, after clearly witnessing issues with the left. Sadly, no one brought this to the crew’s attention, and by this point, the smell of smoke had dissipated, so many believed the situation was under control.

So Close To The Airport

The aircraft was now just a few miles from touchdown, the 737’s landing gear had been lowered, and the passenger cabin was prepared for a precautionary landing.

Suddenly, power from the No. 1 powerplant dropped sharply, and the aircraft began to lose altitude rapidly. Captain Hunt requested that the No. 2 engine be restarted and raised the nose of the 737 in a vain attempt to glide to the runway.

But it was too late. Seconds later, at 20:24, the aircraft struck the ground to the east of the M1 motorway before hurtling across the road and impacting its western embankment. The jet was just 900 metres from the safety of the threshold of runway 27.

Survivors recalled heavy vibrations immediately before the crash, severe enough to open overhead lockers and cause their contents to spill out. Those seated at the rear reported two distinct impacts, while those at the front felt only the final, devastating collision.

The scene that greeted the emergency services was one of complete carnage. The 737 had broken into three pieces. The nose section had travelled up the embankment, while the tail section fractured before buckling over the centre fuselage and wing section.

A Cabin Crew’s Perspective

One of the cabin crew on board Flight 092 that night was Ali Osman, who was kind enough to relay his incredible story of the ill-fated flight.

“I joined British Midland as a member of cabin crew in 1986. The airline was then a small UK domestic carrier, operating the Glasgow/Edinburgh/Belfast shuttle flights predominantly. When I joined, the fleet was made up mainly of Douglas DC-9 aircraft, a great plane to operate, and we had a great team of friendly, professional crew. In 1989, British Midland began taking delivery of brand-new, state-of-the-art Boeing 737-400s.

“I had reported for work with a Belfast-based crew a day earlier and undertaken a check flight before enjoying a night stop in Belfast. The following day, I returned to London with a crew based at Heathrow. I spent much of the flight in the rear galley catching up with the Flight Service Manager, as I, too, had been promoted in November 1988 to FSM.

“On our arrival at Heathrow, the operating crew disembarked, and I waited for the new crew to join. In total, there were six of us [cabin crew] onboard that night, myself, a flight supervisor and four other cabin crew. The flight crew also changed, and the two new pilots (Captain Hunt and First Officer McClelland) boarded. After brief introductions, we had our own briefing and began preparing the cabin for our passengers. The first two flights were routine and nothing out of the ordinary, with the usual bunch of good-humoured passengers.

“I was now looking forward to completing the final two sectors and getting back home to enjoy days off. As passengers boarded, I was working in the front galley, topping up supplies and preparing for the in-flight service. The flight supervisor greeted our passengers while the other crew members were busy in the cabin. We had a few empty seats, and with everyone onboard, we were soon ready for our departure. The aircraft taxied to the runway, and we took off. Once released, we began preparing for the meal service, and I was in the forward galley preparing tea and coffee.

“All of a sudden, there was a huge bang, and I walked across the galley and looked down the aisle. The rest of the crew was making their way to the front. The aircraft began to shudder, and smoke filled the cabin. The vibration was severe, and a thousand things were going through my mind. Lockerbie had happened a few weeks previously, and I kept thinking a bomb had gone off in the hold.

“I felt incredibly calm. It was almost as if the whole situation was surreal. The flight crew rang the chimes, and I walked into the flight deck where every light and indication was illuminated. I stood there for a few seconds before the captain turned around and told me to get the trolleys away and the cabin ready for landing, as we were diverting to East Midlands.

“When I came out into the galley, the vibration had stopped, and the haze had gone. I relayed to the crew who were in the galley what the captain had told me, and that we should clear in quickly. The flight supervisor asked me if she should do the emergency PA, and I said the captain had said it was a diversion. We all went into the cabin and began to clear in. Passengers were very calm and very compliant. Once the cabin was cleared, I asked the crew to maintain a high presence, which I felt would reassure the passengers. The general sense in the cabin was now pretty calm.

“With a short while to go before our landing, I told the two crew at the front to sit down and strap themselves in. I walked to the rear galley, spoke to the #2 crew member, and told her I would do the final check through the cabin and that the three of them should sit down and strap in. I walked up the cabin, ensuring passengers were strapped in and ready for our landing.

“I sat in seat 1D because, as the FSM, I took any available seat in the cabin, and if the flight was full, I would sit in the flight deck. I sat down and strapped myself in next to two friends who were travelling together. The gear came down, and all of a sudden there was a huge bang again, like the sound of a car backfiring.

“A few moments later, the captain made a PA announcement: ‘Ladies and gentlemen, we are now having problems with engine number two. Do not prepare for an emergency landing; prepare for a crash landing. Brace, brace, brace.’ I looked down the aisle, then forward at the girls who were already in the brace position. At this point, I got myself into the brace position…

“A short while later, I opened my eyes. I’d been knocked out by the armrest. I was almost horizontal in my seat, looking up about six feet. I could see the two crew members, one was slumped forward in her jump seat, and the other was walking between the two doors. I could feel pain in my arm, leg and neck. My face was also hurting. At this point, I decided I was having a nightmare and closed my eyes for a few seconds in the hope I would fall asleep. I knew then, because of the pain, that we had crashed. I was totally disoriented.

“I realised the cabin floor had detached itself from the main frame of the aircraft and we had fallen into the hold. I could see trees out of the window and was trying to work out where we were. I called out to one of the crew members and asked if she was ok. She told me she was injured and couldn’t move. I told her I thought I’d broken my leg and I couldn’t move. The other stewardess was trying desperately to get the doors open, but without any success, as we had crashed into trees. I shouted to passengers to remain calm and that the rescue services would be with us shortly.

“The aircraft had hit the embankment of the M1 motorway at junction 24. It had broken into three parts, and the tail section, where the other three crew members were, had flipped up back onto the fuselage. I slipped in and out of consciousness and was trapped for about 90 minutes.

“The carnage around me was just phenomenal, no hat racks, just the bare skin of the aircraft. The cabin was very quiet; I could only hear a couple of voices. The seriousness of the incident had not fully hit me. I then heard a voice shout, ‘We’ve got one of the crew’, and saw a fireman standing over me. All I could say was ‘No, get the passengers out first.’ I was ignored and lifted onto a stretcher and passed down a chain of firefighters until I was put on the motorway to be ferried to the hospital. Once I was put into an ambulance, I asked about the crew down the back and was told there had been several fatalities.

“I arrived at A&E at The Queens Medical Centre, Nottingham and there I was finally reunited with the rest of my colleagues. I was taken down to the theatre, and they decided I needed to be operated on straight away, given the severity of the break to my leg. I had broken my left leg, right arm, right elbow, and my neck and injured my knee. I had lost most of the fillings in my teeth and cracked three. I also had a corker of a black eye and was nicknamed the panda by the nursing staff. The Queens Medical Centre became home for the next three months.

“I knew my life would never be the same again, and I was right. Hardly a day goes by that I don’t think about the crash, and those who didn’t get out alive. Despite my injuries, I was one of the fortunate ones. Forty-seven passengers died as a result of the crash, and many people’s lives were impacted.

“The only good thing that came out of the accident was that so much was learnt about the brace position and CRM. Please never allow yourself to become complacent at work. Always have your wits about you.”

The Aftermath

Thirty-nine passengers died at the scene, and eight more died in the hospital later. Most of those who perished were seated where the fuselage and floor sections failed, with all but one of the deaths sustaining fatal head injuries.

Miraculously, 79 passengers and crew survived, and this, in part, can be put down to the quick actions of the cabin crew. As the situation unfolded, they had very little time to prepare the cabin for landing and, as they believed they would simply be diverting to East Midlands, no emergency briefing was given to passengers. However, the whole cabin and galley were well secured, and all loose carry-on luggage was stowed into the overhead lockers.

Despite being trapped and badly injured themselves, Ali and the other crew shouted instructions, calmed and reassured passengers that help was on its way.

Lessons Learnt

Following the crash, several safety recommendations were implemented. Better crash test dummies were developed to improve safety testing. Seats were strengthened, and latches on overhead lockers were enhanced. Aircraft instrument panels were made easier to read, and all modified engines must now be tested in flight, whereas previously this was required only for new engines.

Much was also learnt about the survivability of plane crashes and the effectiveness of the brace position. Professor Angus Wallace of the Queen’s Medical Centre in Nottingham was baffled at the fact that although many passengers were killed and horrifically injured, others sustained only minor cuts and bruises.

Speaking at the time, Professor Wallace said, “We discovered a lot of those on board had not adopted a brace position for the impact. There were many fractures where people’s legs flailed under the seat in front, and of course, arm and head injuries as they shot forward. I’m pleased to say the CAA and British airlines have now adopted our recommended brace position with your head forward by your knees, your hands over your head, and your feet firmly planted behind your knees so they can’t shoot forward.”

Other recommendations, such as rear-facing seats, were put forward but immediately rejected by various airlines, on the basis that passengers do not want to travel backwards.

One of the most significant changes after Kegworth was the introduction of Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) training to improve relations between flight and cabin crew. During a PA made to the passengers, the captain stated that he had shut down the ‘right’ engine, yet many passengers had witnessed fire coming from the left.

In the subsequent report, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) said: “It must be stated that had some initiative been taken by one or more of the cabin crew who had seen the distress of the left engine, this accident could have been prevented. It must be emphasised, nonetheless, that present patterns of airline training do not provide specifically for the exercise of coordination between cabin and flight crew in such circumstances.”

It is fair to say, however, that the crew were obviously preoccupied with completing their own duties as they prepared the cabin and galleys for landing. And of course, as both crew and passengers put vast levels of trust in our flight deck colleagues, it may well have been assumed that the captain’s reference to the right engine was a mere slip of the tongue. Or that the problems that had been seen with the left engine were in some way consequential to another problem with the right engine.

CRM training is now mandatory across most airlines worldwide. Pilots are taught to take a more team-oriented approach, while cabin crew no longer work under the assumption that ‘the pilot knows best’ and are trained to feel confident enough to challenge any perceived mistakes.

The outcome of the CAA report stated that, “The cause of the accident was that the operating crew shut down the No. 2 engine after a fan blade had fractured in the No 1 engine.” Metal fatigue was blamed for the fan blade fracture, and the lack of training on a new aircraft type, as well as the poor placement of engine instruments in the flight deck, also contributed to the crash.

Hunt and McClelland, both seriously injured, were sacked from British Midland in 1991, though both men said they were ‘scapegoated’ for the airline’s failure to train them on the new plane correctly. McClelland later successfully sued for wrongful dismissal.

Two out of the six cabin crew never flew again. However, four later returned to the skies, a testament to the fact that accidents such as this are rare and our skies continue to be made safer.

For more stories of incredible crew bravery, click here.

Cover Image Credit: AAIB

© Confessions of a Trolley Dolly by Dan Air